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DOES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
HAVE A REMEDIES PROBLEM?                     
A RESPONSE TO ERIC M. SINGER,        
COMPETITIVE PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Steven W. Feldman* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his provocative article, Competitive Public Contracts,1 Eric M. Singer 
claims that deficient contractor performance is inherent in government con-
tracting.2 Singer asserts that, “fundamentally,” public purchasing has a “con-
tract-remedies problem”—the absence of both any “credible threat” and any 
“effective contract remedy to deter or correct [contractor] misbehavior.”3 Un-
like private buyers, who have plausible threats to motivate contractors to per-
form properly, governments are said to “often” labor  under intrinsic and ex-
trinsic limitations that undermine remedial alternatives.4 Consequently, Singer 
argues that governments (especially state and local agencies) have no “effective 
                                                 
*  Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville, Alabama. 
Thanks to Eric Singer, David Horton, David Hoffman, George Kuney, Ryan Black, Dale 
Gipson, and Tim Felker for helpful comments and suggestions. Special love and thanks to 
my dear wife, Gayla Feldman. 
1  Eric M. Singer, Competitive Public Contracts, 102 VA. L. REV. 1297 (2016). The federal 
government is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the world with a procurement 
budget approximating a half-trillion dollars annually. See Steven L. Schooner & David J. 
Berteau, Emerging Policy and Practice Issues, 2017 GOV’T CONTS. YEAR IN REV. BRIEFS 22 
(Feb. 2017); see also K&L GATES LLP, K&L GATES PUBLIC POLICY LAW PRACTICE: 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND PROCUREMENT (2011), http://www.klgates.com/files/upload/ 
Public_Policy_Govt_Contracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASS9-8UDN]. States and localities also 
expend billions of dollars annually on public contracts. Thus, the issue of remedies in gov-
ernment procurement has major practical and legal importance for the U.S. economy. 
2  Singer, supra note 1, at 1298–99. Although Singer says the remedies problem is particular-
ly acute in state and local public contracting, see id., he states that the delays and expenses 
pertaining to failed projects are the same for “government contracts of all types and across 
all jurisdictions.” Id. at 1301. Singer repeatedly cites to federal procurement regulations, 
GAO decisions, and law journal articles on federal procurement. See, e.g., id. at 1311 n.59 
(discussing article on termination for convenience); id. at 1321 n.97 (noting GAO protest 
decision on past performance evaluations); id. at 1323 n.104 (addressing federal acquisition 
regulation on single versus multiple awards). Accordingly, this response considers munici-
pal, state, and federal procurement procedures. 
3  Id. at 1299. 
4  See id. (pointing to “various limitations unique to government”). 
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contract remedy” to induce improved contractor performance.5 Among these 
“ineffective” remedies, according to Singer, are terminations for default and 
past performance assessments of contractors. 
To overcome these obstacles to effective government enforcement of pub-
lic contracts, Singer proposes “competitive dual sourcing (‘CDS’).”6 “Dual 
sourcing” (“DS”) is the buyer’s horizontal splitting of work between two or 
more independent contractors.7 CDS incorporates DS but goes one step further: 
it allows the government to “terminate” one firm’s unsatisfactory effort and re-
assign all or part of the work to another firm through the exercise of contractual 
options in the replacement contract.8 In this way, CDS is said to both decrease 
costs and effectively address contractor “misbehavior.”9 Singer argues that 
“CDS is the best available remedy for government contracts and should be im-
plemented widely.”10 
Singer’s article is nuanced and delves into the important subject of reme-
dies in public procurement. I take no issue with his challenging the orthodoxy 
and suggesting new ways to improve the procurement system. Nevertheless, 
this Response respectfully parts company with Singer’s descriptive and norma-
tive critique that remedies in government contracting are inherently problemat-
ic. 
This Response proceeds as follows: Part I disputes Singer’s charge that 
termination for default fails as a contractor control mechanism. Part II disagrees 
with Singer’s descriptive claim that agencies “underutilize[]” even “useful” 
past performance assessments.11 He contends, without empirical support, that 
government actors “frequently elect not to advertise” contractor performance 
failures for fears of both generating bid protests from the slighted firm and im-
pugning the integrity of the procurement officer that awarded the earlier con-
tract.12  Part III asserts that, besides raising efficiency issues, CDS is not legally 
workable because it conflicts with the principles of default terminations and 
contract options. Rather than being inherently problematic, current remedies in 
                                                 
5  Id. (emphasis added). 
6  Id. at 1302. 
7  Id. at 1302, 1322. 
8  See id. at 1302, 1305, 1323. CDS can take the form of geographic divisions (Firm A serves 
the east side and Firm B serves the west side of a defined region), operational divisions 
(Firm A works on Facility X and Firm B works on Facility Y), and ongoing competitions 
(whichever firm completes the first stage of a project would receive a larger share of the pro-
ject’s second stage). Id. at 1304. 
9  Id. at 1302. 
10  Id. at 1354. However, Singer does not describe how, exactly, combining CDS with other 
contract remedies would work. Compare, e.g., id. (stating that “CDS can be implemented in 
nearly all government contracts”), with id. at 1309–10 (stating that CDS does not necessarily 
supplant other remedies but can supplement them). 
11  See id. at 1321. 
12  Id. at 1320–22, 1323 n.105. 
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government contracting reflect the reality that “[t]he Government wields enor-
mous powers in its contractual relations.”13 
I. IS TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT AN EFFECTIVE                                      
DETERRENT AND CORRECTIVE REMEDY? 
“Termination for default” is the Government’s exercise of the right to dis-
charge a contract, either in whole or in part, “because of the contractor’s actual 
or anticipated failure to perform its contractual obligations.”14 A termination 
for default discharges the Government’s remaining contract duties and renders 
the contractor liable for the consequences of poor performance. These ramifica-
tions include such actions as the requirement to reimburse the government for 
its excess costs above the original contract price, provided the government con-
ducts a reprocurement of the same or similar items from another source.15 Un-
der the Christian doctrine, the default clause is mandatory by operation of 
                                                 
13  WALTER F. PETTIT ET AL., GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DEFAULT TERMINATION 1-2 (1991 & 
Supp. 1995). Singer fails to mention the full universe of remedies by which governments can 
hold contractors accountable for breach or other misconduct. Singer makes no argument that 
these important remedies are inherently problematic or lack credibility. Regarding these oth-
er remedies, two commentators discuss the following federal contract rights: “Correction or 
Re-Work at the Contractor’s Expense”; “Equitable Reduction in Price or Other Compensa-
tion”; “Liquidated Damages”; “Reduction or Withholding of Award or Incentive Fees”; “Re-
jection of Nonconforming Supplies or Services”; and “Re-procurement at the Contractor’s 
Expense”. KATE M. MANUEL & RODNEY M. PERRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44202, 
SELECTED LEGAL MECHANISMS WHEREBY THE GOVERNMENT CAN HOLD CONTRACTORS 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM OR OTHER MISCONDUCT i (2015). The same com-
mentary lists some off-contract disciplinary procedures, including: “Responsibility Determi-
nations Prior to Award of a Contract”; “Debarment and Suspension”; “Civil Provisions of 
the False Claims Act”; and the “Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act.” Id. Parallel regimes for 
a number of these remedies often exist for state and local governments. See, e.g., NASHVILLE 
& DAVIDSON CTY., TENN., GEN. ORDINANCES tit. 4, (2006), http://www.nashville.gov/ Fi-
nance/Procurement/Procurement-Division-Office.aspx [https://perma.cc/S7AX-RB4S] (Pro-
curement Code); PROCUREMENT STANDARDS BD., METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON 
CTY., TENN., REGULATIONS TO THE 1992 PROCUREMENT CODE (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Finance/Purchasing/Regulations%20201402
06.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RD8-ZUHH] (Procurement Regulations). Debarment in even a 
single county can have far-reaching consequences for a contractor. See, e.g., Listing of Con-
tractors Debarred in Los Angeles County, L.A. COUNTY ONLINE: DOING BUSINESS WITH US, 
http://doingbusiness.lacounty.gov/DebarmentList.htm [https://perma.cc/8RFX-MJCZ] (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2017) (providing publicly accessible list of locally debarred contractors). 
14  48 C.F.R. (FAR) § 49.401(a) (2016). State and local public contracts almost always con-
tain default provisions. See Aaron P. Silberman, How Public Agencies May (Or May Not) 
Terminate Contracts, 49 PROC. L. 5, 5 (2014). 
15  See JOHN CIBINIC, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 883–84 (4th 
ed. 2006); PETTIT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2–20; see also Armour of Am. v. United States, 
96 Fed. Cl. 726, 759–69 (2011) (comprehensive discussion of excess costs of reprocure-
ment). State remedies for default sometimes incorporate this same governmental right of re-
dress. See, e.g., 41-1 R.I. CODE R. § 1 app. a (2017) (“[T]he contractor shall be liable for the 
excess costs incurred by [the State] as a result of the contractor’s default.”). 
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law—even when it is expressly absent from the contract—as a deeply ingrained 
strand of public procurement policy.16 
Singer briefly acknowledges that termination for cause is a “drastic reme-
dy.”17 Nevertheless, Singer says that the administrative and political costs of 
termination for default “often” disqualify this remedy as a “credible threat” to 
discipline a contractor’s performance.18 This Response addresses these admin-
istrative and political costs in turn. 
A. Administrative Costs of Default  
Singer emphasizes that the administrative time and effort for the govern-
ment to prove a termination for default are cost prohibitive and “often lead” the 
government to convert the termination for default to one for the government’s 
convenience.19 The latter “termination for convenience” remedy has no re-
quirement for the government to prove a material breach (or even any contrac-
tor fault). Termination for convenience must be in the government’s, and not 
necessarily in the contractor’s, interests (for example, when the government no 
longer needs the product or service).20 Thus, this remedy generally results in 
greater contractor compensation than what would otherwise be available in a 
termination for default—such as compensation for contractor costs on work 
undelivered to the government.21  
Singer’s argument regarding  prohibitive administrative costs depends 
largely on a single anecdote: the failed Los Angeles subway replacement pro-
curement.22 Singer indicates that this procurement history illustrates how the 
                                                 
16  See, e.g., H & R Machinists Co., ASBCA No. 38440, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,373 (citing G.L. 
Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 
(1963)). Some state courts have approved the Christian doctrine. See, e.g., Dep’t of Gen. 
Servs. v. Harmans Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 633 A.2d 939, 947 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). 
17  Singer, supra note 1, at 1312 n.61. This passing remark does not convey the broad impact 
of a possible default. Respected commentators have said, “Termination . . . for default is the 
most traumatic experience that can befall a Government contractor.” PETTIT ET AL., supra 
note 13, at i; see also id. at 1-7. A default termination usually entails “severe” consequences 
to the contractor and “not infrequently leads to the contractor’s financial ruin.” CIBINIC, su-
pra note 15, at 883–84. 
18  Singer, supra note 1, at 1299. Singer’s claim about the inefficacy of a termination for de-
fault is striking considering his advocacy for CDS. Singer does not sufficiently answer a crit-
ical question: why is termination a “genuine threat” (and therefore a motivating force that 
deters contractor breach) under a CDS approach, id. at 1324, even though it is (apparently) 
not a “credible” measure for achieving remedial success during ordinary contract administra-
tion, id. at 1299? 
19  Id. at 1312 n.61. 
20  CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 15, at 1054 (no longer needing products/services is the “most 
common” ground for termination for convenience). 
21  Compare FAR 49.402-2(a) (2016) (default terminations), with FAR 49.201(a) (conven-
ience terminations). 
22  Singer, supra note 1, at 1298–1301 (detailing the failed Los Angeles subway replacement 
project). 
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government will “[often] thr[o]w in the towel” when it engages the contractor 
in high-stakes litigation over a default.23 But such an outcome is not the norm; 
rather, the limited available evidence shows that, once the government initiates 
a default action, it generally litigates to a judgment with great success. One 
commentator notes that the federal tribunals consider about 100 termination-
for-default cases a year, and that, on average, contractors have about a five-
percent chance of prevailing.24 Without sufficient corroborating empirical data, 
Singer’s thesis—that the incidence of prohibitive costs commonly discourages 
the government’s full pursuit of a termination for default—is, at best, unproven. 
Singer further indicates the administrative costs are prohibitive for a de-
fault termination because the agency cannot simply hire a replacement contrac-
tor, but rather “ordinarily” must commence the procurement anew in accord-
ance with competitive bidding requirements.25 These steps, he says, include 
market research, a new solicitation, new proposals, additional evaluation com-
mittee meetings, more oral presentations, re-ranking offers, performing a new 
responsibility review of the proposed awardee, possible administrative bid pro-
tests, and public hearings on the award decision.26 The process of selecting a 
new contractor for a “complex, contested” project “often lasts two years or 
more and can cost of millions of dollars.”27  
Singer cites no sources for his assertion that the reprocurement after a de-
fault “ordinarily restart[s] the entire selection process.”28 Singer’s (unsupport-
ed) claim differs markedly from the federal experience. In construing the feder-
al regulations, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has said in 
its bid protest decisions that the full range of procurement statutes and regula-
tions governing conventional procurements, including the full-scale competi-
tion rules, are not strictly applicable in a reprocurement after a default.29 The 
                                                 
23  Id. at 1312 n.61. 
24  See PETTIT ET AL., supra note 13, at 16-2 (“Moreover, only about one out of four appealed 
terminations is actually decided by a board; the remainder are withdrawn or settled before 
the board renders a decision. Therefore, if one considers all appealed terminations, rather 
than merely the appeals that are decided, the contractor is successful in overturning only 
about one out of 20 terminations.”).     
25  Singer, supra note 1, at 1299 n.6. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  See id. Indeed, in the example of the failed Los Angeles subway replacement project, 
Singer notes that “Metro . . . voted to waive its ordinary competitive-bidding procedures and 
instead award the remaining tunneling work to its existing contractors via an expedited, 
competitive process.” Id. at 1300 n.10. Significantly, Singer is left without a single example 
of a project where the reprocurement process took several years and cost several million dol-
lars. 
29  See, e.g., Premier Petro-Chem., Inc., B-244324, 91-2 CPD ¶ 205, 1991 WL 177321, at *2 
(Comp. Gen. Aug. 27, 1991). The GAO is an agency within the U.S. Congress and is the 
leading administrative forum where aggrieved firms can allege that a solicitation, a proposed 
award, or an award violates a federal procurement statute or regulation. See 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3551–57 (2016) (providing the GAO’s authority to review bid protests). 
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reasoning behind this is that the Government is not letting a new contract but 
rather is enforcing its right of cover under the default clause against the account 
of the terminated contractor.30  
GAO bid protest decisions have permitted contracting officials “considera-
ble latitude” in using the selection method best suited to accomplishing the re-
procurement after a default.31  To conserve agency resources and to minimize 
procurement processing times, the federal Government may simply negotiate 
an award with the next offeror in line on the original solicitation, at the original 
price. Under such circumstances, an agency can reasonably view the offers re-
ceived under the original solicitation as an acceptable measure of what the 
competition would have been and therefore whether it met the regulatory re-
quirements.32  
The GAO’s bid protest decision in Performance Textiles exemplifies this 
approach.33 In that case, the field agency originally solicited bids for a nylon 
fabric purchase but terminated the lowest bidder for default because the award-
ee had repudiated the contract. Performance and Landau were, respectively, the 
second and third-lowest bidders in line for award. Prior to the default action, 
and approximately ninety days from the bid opening, the field agency contacted 
Performance and inquired whether it would revive its original bid. Performance 
revived its bid, conditioned on a price increase stemming from changed market 
conditions. The field agency’s procurement officer accepted Performance’s 
conditions and submitted the Performance award package to higher authority 
for approval.  
The agency’s higher-level Procurement Executive rejected the field agen-
cy’s proposed award. This official first noted that Performance's revised bid 
price was higher than Landau’s original bid price. The Procurement Executive 
concluded that, because Landau had confirmed its original bid price upon noti-
fication, an award to Performance at a price higher than Landau’s confirmed 
                                                 
30  See CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 15, at 1023 (“A reprocurement is technically a purchase for 
the contractor’s account and not a new purchase by the government.”).  
31  Master Sec., Inc., B-235711, 89-2 CPD ¶ 303, 1989 WL 241198, at *2 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 
4, 1989). Some states and localities use the same or similar standard for a reprocurement af-
ter a default. See, e.g., 27-1 MISS. CODE R. app. c (West 2016) (Termination for Default) 
(“[T]he Agency Head or designee may procure similar supplies or services in a manner and 
upon terms deemed appropriate by the Agency Head or designee.”); 41-1 R.I. CODE R. § 1 
app. a (2017) (state agency “[m]ay procure similar goods or services in a manner and upon 
terms it deems appropriate . . . .”). Similarly, Los Angeles County’s sample contract provides 
that, after a termination for default, “the County may procure, upon such terms and in such 
manner as the County may deem appropriate, goods and services similar to those so termi-
nated.” CTY. OF L.A., STATE OF CAL., SAMPLE COUNTY CONTRACT WITH COUNTY HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES (H&HS) DEPARTMENT SPECIFIC CONTRACT LANGUAGE INSERTED ¶ 
8.46.2, at 88 (2003), http://ceo.lacounty.gov/sib/pdf/SampleContract.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4VE9-H6M4] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).  
32  Performance Textiles, Inc., B-256895, 94-2 CPD ¶ 65, 1994 WL 424235, at *2 (Comp. 
Gen. Aug. 8, 1994). 
33  See generally id. 
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price would have violated the government's duty to mitigate damages resulting 
from the default. When the agency awarded the reprocurement contract to Lan-
dau, Performance protested to the GAO. In denying the protest, GAO said the 
agency had no obligation to solicit (or entertain) a new offer from Performance 
and that the agency had followed all the proper procedures. 
Another streamlined competition technique is where the agency continues 
the original negotiated procurement by first soliciting additional final proposal 
revisions from the previously unsuccessful offerors and then making an award 
based on the final round of submissions.34 (Note that the protester in Perfor-
mance Textiles had advocated this approach, but the GAO upheld the agency’s 
discretion in making the award on the original bids.35) In other cases, however, 
the GAO has approved of situations where agencies solicited modified pro-
posals.36 These results are not contradictory but instead show the agency’s wide 
discretion in adopting a reprocurement procedure in accordance with its best 
interests under the particular facts. If the agency strives for the maximum prac-
ticable competition,37 obtains reasonable prices to the extent practicable,38 and 
mitigates damages,39 then the chances are high that the agency’s method of 
competition will be upheld in a protest.40 
These foundational principles are not limited to federal contracts. Most 
state and local jurisdictions have limited guidance regarding the procedures for 
reprocuring a contract after a default. When conducting such a reprocurement, 
states and localities may properly follow the GAO decisions construing the 
federal model where state and local procedures are sparse or unclear.41 State 
                                                 
34  See, e.g., DynaLantic Corp., 68 Comp. Gen. 413, 414 (1989). 
35  See Performance Textiles, 1994 WL 424235 at *2. See generally supra text accompany-
ing notes 32–34. 
36  But see, e.g., DynaLantic, 68 Comp. Gen. at 415 (sustaining protest on the separate issue 
that “[t]he Army failed to assure that offerors were competing on an equal basis, and that this 
failure clearly could have affected the outcome of the competition”). 
37  Master Sec., Inc., B-235711, 89-2 CPD ¶ 303, 1989 WL 241198, at *2 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 
4, 1989). 
38  Id. 
39  Hemet Valley Flying Serv., Inc., 57 Comp. Gen. 703, 705–06 (1978). 
40  In my thirty-four years of experience as an Army procurement attorney, I have seen many 
default cases where the agency uses the most expeditious procurement method possible 
simply because a pressing need exists for the items or services. Even for larger projects, the 
ordinary reprocurement time frame was weeks or months (not years), and the administrative 
costs were in the thousands of dollars (not in the millions). In only one or two instances have 
I seen where the process began anew—and those two instances were due to some irremedia-
ble defect in the procurement process warranting cancellation (such as a deficient Scope of 
Work that could not be repaired to permit a fair competition).  
41  See Silberman, supra note 14, at 5 (“Public agencies often use, or at least borrow from, 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) standard termination clauses. . . . Where there are 
no state law decisions that directly involve the termination of contractors by public agencies, 
state courts will likely find federal decisions persuasive.” (endnotes omitted)).  
20 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM [Vol. 2:13  
and federal courts alike often afford great weight to GAO doctrine on procure-
ment issues.42  
B. Political Costs 
The other issue Singer identifies as working against termination for default 
is the political costs of this procedure. He posits that state and local politicians 
(and not the “bureaucracy”) “generally” or “often” award contracts, which 
gives these officials “strong political incentives to overlook contractor prob-
lems.”43 These incentives are said to exist because these officials are reluctant 
to admit they erred upfront in selecting the contractor and because contractors 
can unduly influence these officials through election campaign “donations” and 
other financial inducements.44  
While Singer is certainly correct that some procurement officials are too 
beholden to political influence, Singer’s broad empirical claims closely linking 
politics and procurement are ultimately unsupported.  Singer references merely 
two anecdotes where he finds that politics unduly discouraged contracting offi-
cials from completing a termination for default. In the first circumstance, a sin-
gle member of the Metro Los Angeles Council spoke out against the govern-
ment’s contract manager and in favor of the contractor who had botched the 
Los Angeles subway replacement project.45 In the second example, the lead 
contractor on Boston’s failed “Big Dig” underground transportation project had 
many political ties with local officials, including lobbying, employment of fam-
ily members, and campaign contributions.46  
Even if the individuals involved in those two contracts did in fact engage in 
misbehavior (Singer offers no such evidence), Singer’s speculation and insinua-
tions about the perceived misbehavior of a few government officials in just two 
procurements in no way credit his broad accusation that many, if not most, state 
and local governmental officials have “strong political incentives to overlook 
                                                 
42  E.g., B.K. Instrument Co. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 729–30 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[W]e 
look for guidance to decisions of the Comptroller General, an official with wide expertise 
and experience concerning government procurement awards to which federal courts should 
accord deference when deciding procurement cases.”); accord, e.g., Pac. Architects Collabo-
rative v. State, 166 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (“We are strongly persuad-
ed by decisions relating to federal procurement bidding.”). 
43  Singer, supra note 1, at 1311 & n.55, 1315. Singer offers no support for his assertion that 
elected officials (the “legislative body”) “generally award[]” state and local contracts. See, 
e.g., id. at 1311 n.55. However, in most states and localities, contracting authority in fact re-
sides within the executive branch. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41 § 103 (1989) (city 
mayor appoints purchasing agents in cities that have adopted the statutory program); see al-
so, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 2-7-202 (2006) (state procurement administrator delegates 
contracting authority to state governmental units). 
44  Singer, supra note 1, at 1311–12, 1315. 
45  Id. at 1311 n.56. See generally id. at 1298–1301. 
46  Id. at 1311 n.58. See generally id. at 1300 n.9. 
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contractor problems.”47 Instead, the great majority of state and local procure-
ment officials do their best to comply with stringent standards of conduct that 
forbid politics from tainting procurement decisions.48 
II. PAST PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS AS A REPUTATIONAL SANCTION 
Singer calls out adverse past performance evaluations as an ineffective 
reputational sanction. He argues that, even if adverse past performance infor-
mation exists on a contractor, the government “infrequently ha[s] reliable, usa-
ble information on a contractor’s past performance issues.”49 Singer further 
contends agency past performance assessments are “underutilized” because 
“governments frequently elect not to advertise the failures of their contractors” 
and officials lack sufficient incentives to uncover damaging information.50 
Even when they have these reports, procurement agents are “often hesitant to 
use” them because of the “fear” of a bid protest from an aggrieved firm.51  
Singer cites the federal government for much of his criticisms. Relying up-
on a 2009 GAO study, Singer argues, 
A recent study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that, even 
where the solicitation emphasized past performance as an evaluation criterion, 
past performance was only rarely considered by the procuring agency, and the 
officials interviewed explained that the major impediments to a consideration of 
past performance were lack of an ability to verify the objectivity of the infor-
mation or properly assess its relevance.
52
 
Singer’s critique is out of date because he fails to mention many significant 
statutory, regulatory and policy developments occurring after the GAO’s 2009 
study. 
In 2011 and 2012, Congress required executive branch agencies to develop 
effective strategies for obtaining timely, accurate, and complete past perfor-
                                                 
47  Id. at 1311. 
48  For example, Tennessee state procurement officials are subject to the Tennessee Central 
Procurement Office's Business Conduct and Ethics Policy and Procedures, which cover all 
aspects of contract formation and administration while promoting full and competition, in-
tegrity, and transparency. See CENT. PROCUREMENT OFFICE OF THE STATE OF TENN., Policy 
No. 2013-009, BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS POLICY AND PROCEDURES (Mar. 20, 2014), 
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/generalservices/cpo/attachments/Business_Conduct_and_
Ethics_Policy_and_Procedures_3_20_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DEE-SSP3]. 
49  Singer, supra note 1, at 1321 (also claiming “most performance problems are not docu-
mented in the public record”). 
50  Id. at 1320–21. 
51  See id. at 1321–22. 
52  Id. at 1321 n.99 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-374, FEDERAL 
CONTRACTORS: BETTER PERFORMANCE INFORMATION NEEDED TO SUPPORT AGENCY 
CONTRACT AWARD DECISIONS 2–3 (2009)). 
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mance information (PPI) from government databases.53 The statutes and im-
plementing regulations54 had the desired effect: In a 2013 congressional report, 
the GAO noted that the Department of Defense (DOD) increased workforce 
training and developed tools and metrics to improve PPI oversight.55 While 
challenges remained because of acquisition workforce shortages, personnel 
turnover, and the difficulty of obtaining needed information, the GAO said that 
the DOD—in almost doubling the number of PPI assessments from Fiscal 
Years 2010 to 2013—had “greatly improved” oversight and accountability.56  
In 2014, the GAO issued an executive-branch-wide PPI study.57 The GAO 
noted that, since 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) had 
issued numerous policies to improve the reporting and use of this data.58 For 
one, the GAO praised the federal government’s May 2010 decision authorizing 
the web-enabled Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System 
(CPARS)59 as the single government-wide database for agency past perfor-
mance evaluations (and any contractor rebuttals).60 The GAO also reported that 
“[executive-branch] agencies have generally improved their level of compli-
ance with [PPI] reporting requirements . . . .”61 The GAO did not find, as Sing-
er speculates, problems with PPI usage due to any need to avoid media cover-
age, lack of positive incentives, desire to protect fellow officials, or fear of 
protests.62  
                                                 
53  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 853, 
126 Stat. 1632, 1856 (2012) (Government-wide); National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 806, 125 Stat. 1298, 1487 (2011) (DOD-specific). 
54  See FAR 42.1502 (2016). 
55  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-589, CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE: DOD 
ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE REPORTING OF PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 5–8 (2013) 
[hereinafter GAO 2013 REPORT]. 
56  Id. at 6–7. 
57  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-707, CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE: ACTIONS 
TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE REPORTING OF PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION (2014) [hereinafter 
GAO 2014 REPORT]. 
58  Id. at 5. 
59  CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE REPORTING SYS., https://www.cpars.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ 
B4KE-TNXZ] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).  
60  See GAO 2014 REPORT, supra note 57, at 4, 7–9. 
61  See id. at 9. 
62  See generally id. Although Singer contends that the prospect of a protest induces agencies 
to ignore PPI, the agency prevails in almost all past performance protests. See Vernon J. Ed-
wards, Postscript VI: Past Performance Evaluations, 20 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 51 (2006) 
(GAO sustains only about 13% of such protests on the merits). In truth, agencies have more 
fear of protest when they ignore PPI, because, as the GAO has long held, “In certain circum-
stances, when evaluating past performance, we have held that evaluators cannot ignore in-
formation of which they are personally aware (i.e., information that is ‘too close at hand’), 
even if that information is not included in the offeror's proposal.” Consummate Comput. 
Consultant Sys., LLC, B-410566.2, 2015 CPD 176, 2015 WL 3814381, at *4 n.6 (Comp. 
Gen. June 8, 2015). 
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Lastly, terminations for default are a special PPI concern. Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulations require that both contractors and agencies promptly report 
terminations for default to the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity In-
formation System (FAPIIS),63 which was established in 2010. FAPIIS compiles 
in one location information from four pre-existing contract performance-related 
databases (one being CPARS).64 Generally, contracting officials must check 
FAPIIS prior to the award of a new contract before deciding the contractor’s 
work history clears the contractor as a responsible entity.65 If an agency issues a 
termination for default, a high likelihood exists that sister agencies will use 
FAPIIS to obtain reliable information about recent default actions on a contrac-
tor—even if the matter is still in litigation. Similarly, in a 2016 Survey of State 
Procurement Practices, the National Association of State Procurement Officials 
found that state central procurement offices across twenty-four states track and 
maintain a record of vendor performance.66 This simple act of clicking on a link 
in FAPIIS (or in a similar state database) undercuts Singer’s contention that 
“relevant [performance] information is not often readily available.”67  
III. ISSUES WITH COMPETITIVE DUAL SOURCING 
Singer’s centerpiece reform raises practical and legal concerns that gov-
ernments should consider before they adopt CDS.  
A. Practical Concerns 
One weakness of CDS as an instrument for transformational procurement 
reform is the absence of empirical evidence showing proof of this remedy’s 
purported reduced costs and improved contractor performance.68 Singer also 
makes the major (and similarly unsubstantiated) leap that what might work for 
a large project would be just as effective for all projects of varying magnitudes 
and complexity.69 He omits any mention of implementing a pilot study prior to 
                                                 
63  See FAR §§ 42.1501–.1503 (2016). 
64  See FAR 9.104-6; id. § 9.105-2(b); id. § 42.1503(g)–(h). 
65  See FAR 9.104-6; see also id. § 9.105-1(c). 
66  NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS, SURVEY SUMMARY REPORT: 2016 
SURVEY OF STATE PROCUREMENT PRACTICES 9 (2016), http://www.naspo.org/2016Survey 
[https://perma.cc/6WBP-DTKS]. See generally, e.g., Listing of Contractors Debarred in Los 
Angeles County, supra note 13. 
67  Singer, supra note 1, at 1317. 
68  Singer cites just three examples of CDS: New York City’s procurement for home con-
struction services after Hurricane Sandy, id. at 1327; the replacement of the New York Sub-
way system in 1913, id. at 1328–30; and the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad in 
1861, id. at 1330–32. These projects did not contain the contract options that are integral 
parts of Singer’s CDS reform, and he proffers no specific corroborating data on cost savings 
and improved performance flowing directly from CDS. 
69  See id. at 1304 (arguing that “CDS can be implemented as a remedial solution in subna-
tional government procurement contracts of all types and . . . can . . . fit virtually any pro-
cured good or service”); see also id. (advocating for “CDS as the best available remedial 
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his suggested wholesale adoption of CDS. He does not mention the likely out-
come for the wholesale adoption of an unproven remedial tool: the occurrence 
of unforeseen effects pursuant to the law of unintended consequences—when a 
deceptively simple solution (such as CDS) seeks to regulate a highly complex 
world (such as that of government purchasing).70  
Nevertheless, Singer would require a CDS approach—without empirical 
proof of its potential effectiveness— for “nearly all government contracts” and 
with only limited avenues for waiver.71 His reason for this lack of flexibility is 
that, because government employees innately prefer the “tried-and-true” over 
untested alternatives (even “at the expense of innovation”),72 any implementa-
tion of “CDS cannot be left to the discretion of the procurement officer[.]”73  
As stated above, Singer’s prescription bypasses a pilot study. The ad-
vantages of a pilot study (defined as a smaller scale implementation of the larg-
er proposal) are well-known: namely, (a) it allows preliminary testing of the 
hypothesis that can lead to a more realistic and verifiable hypothesis; (b) it can 
suggest ideas, approaches and clues the researcher might not have foreseen be-
fore conducting the pilot study; and (c) it can save a great deal of time and 
money if it turns out that the hypothesis is unproductive, in whole or in part, 
                                                                                                                 
strategy for nonmilitary public procurement contracts, particularly at the state and local lev-
el”). 
70  See In re Schwartz, 461 B.R. 93, 98 n.4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (noting similar observa-
tion about the typical impact of the law of unintended consequences). 
71  Singer, supra note 1, at 1342, 1354. Singer acknowledges certain circumstances where 
CDS would be unproductive, such as for off-the-shelf commercial products available from 
multiple sources). See id. at 1354. However, Singer overlooks that law and policy can actual-
ly require purchase of such commercial items—for instance, “when they are available to 
meet the needs of the agency.” See FAR 12.101(b) (2016). In Fiscal Year 2016, the Depart-
ment of Defense alone spent $47 billion for commercial items. GAO Reports Decline in 
DOD Use of Commercial Item Contracting Procedures, 59 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 225 (July 
26, 2017). By failing to discuss special procurement procedures for large-scale commercial 
items, Singer significantly (and inadvertently) undermines his claim that CDS can “fit virtu-
ally any procured good or service.” 
72  Singer, supra note 1, at 1344. 
73  Id. Singer argues public servants have a disincentive for exercising ingenuity because 
they “do not receive bonuses for taking risks that pay off, or for ingenuity in general.” Id. 
Singer has overlooked that in many government offices, managers do place high value on 
skilled employees who suggest creative ways of doing business. For example, each year the 
Secretary of the Army personally hands out various excellence-in-contracting awards to de-
serving individuals and teams in the procurement work force. See generally Acquisition 
Awards, U.S. ARMY: ACQUISITION SUPPORT CTR. http://asc.army.mil/web/acquisition-
awards/ [https://perma.cc/A5YE-GFQ8] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). Recipients value these 
awards both for the public recognition and their role in facilitating career advancement. Ad-
ditionally, federal agencies have a very active program for awarding monetary bonuses to 
employees who execute their duties in an exemplary manner. See generally U.S. Office of 
Personnel Mgmt., Approaches to Calculating Performance-Based Cash Awards, OPM.GOV 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/performance-management/performance-
management-cycle/rewarding/approaches-to-calculating-performance-based-cash-awards/ 
[https://perma.cc/EA5F-KPE3] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
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when put in practice.74 Given the breadth of CDS and of Singer’s sweeping 
proposal to transform governmental procurement, a pilot study would be quite 
useful for a government considering CDS to experiment on a smaller scale with 
this new (and presently untested) contracting solution. 
B. Legal Problems 
Singer’s proposal also raises legal concerns because: (1) CDS is a con-
structive termination for default; and (2) it violates the rules on contractual op-
tions. 
Singer indicates that CDS is (technically) not a default termination reme-
dy.75 Even though he suggests that the agency using CDS may “terminate” one 
firm’s unsatisfactory effort and reassign of all or part of the work, he still con-
siders the remedy essentially akin to a termination for the government’s con-
venience.76 However, when the government is discharging a contract due to the 
contractor’s performance deficiencies, that action is not akin to a termination 
for convenience: Both in form and in substance the action is a termination for 
default (which, like CDS, can be appealed to a board of contract appeals or a 
court). Indeed, under the procurement regulations, it is improper for an agency 
to terminate for convenience where the circumstances in fact show a contrac-
tor’s default.77  
Case law recognizes that “whether a contractor has been terminated for de-
fault is a functional determination.”78 Under CDS, the agency takes away work 
from one contractor because of its performance deficiencies—which is the 
hallmark of a termination for default.79 Importantly, Singer would have agen-
cies apply the functional equivalent of termination for default without follow-
ing the procedural steps and safeguards that often must precede imposition of 
that remedy.80  
Before finding a contractor in default for reasons other than untimely de-
livery of supplies or services, the contracting agency must follow the proper 
procedures, which ordinarily require contracting officers to send the contractor 
                                                 
74  See, e.g., Miles D. Woken, Ctr. For Teaching & Learning, Planning Research Papers 7: 
Advantages of a Pilot Study, UNIV. OF ILL. SPRINGFIELD, www.uis.edu/ctl/wp-content/up 
loads/sites/76/2013/03/ctlths7.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S54-3BY2] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
75  See Singer, supra note 1, at 1309–10, 1323–24.  
76  See id. at 1336–37 (stating that the shift in work from one contractor to another “is related 
conceptually to a termination for convenience”).  
77  See, e.g., Bendix Corp., ASBCA No. 2081, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,717 (“[W]here the right to 
terminate for default exists, the contracting officer not only may, but, . . . must terminate for 
default if he is to terminate at all. Under such circumstances he may not terminate for the 
convenience of the Government.” (quoting Artisan Elecs. Corp., ASBCA No. 14154, 73-1 
BCA ¶ 9807, aff’d 499 F.2d 608 (Ct. Cl. 1974))). 
78  See Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 779, 785 (2012) (emphasis 
added). 
79  See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (explaining remedy). 
80  See generally Singer, supra note 1, at 1322–24. 
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a cure notice.81 This notice gives the contractor the opportunity to either correct 
the problem, rebut the agency’s grounds for a default, or provide adequate as-
surances that it will make sufficient progress to complete the contract satisfac-
torily.82 A court or a board of contract appeals may overturn a default termina-
tion in this context if the contractor can establish the agency’s prejudicial 
failure to provide the required cure notice advising the contractor of its perfor-
mance deficiencies and providing a reasonable time for the contractor to re-
solve the issues.83  
Another legal issue with CDS is Singer’s treatment of options. In CDS, 
when the contractor “fails” under a contract permitting reassignment of “all or 
portions” of the work from one contractor to another,84 the government may 
exercise a “remedial” contract option.85 This option, he indicates, “is analogous 
to” a fixed-price “call option.”86 In this manner, Singer contends, the govern-
ment can exercise its discretion to achieve the “full benefits of competition” be-
tween the two firms where termination of the original contractor becomes nec-
essary.87 
Some background on the law of options will illuminate some weaknesses 
in CDS. An option is an unaccepted offer to sell upon agreed terms that the op-
tionee may unilaterally accept to make those terms part of the contract.88 Op-
tions should be clear and definite and should not require further negotiations to 
work out the material terms (including price). When the parties are unable to 
define the contractor’s obligations until they negotiate the option exercise, the 
attributes of a valid option are absent.89 As the GAO has ruled, when the option 
is indefinite, such an open-ended arrangement is little more than an advance 
                                                 
81  See Universal Shelters of Am., Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 127, 144 (2009) (citing 
FAR 12.403(c)(1)). See generally PETTIT ET AL., supra note 13, at 4-25 to -31. 
82  See Composite Laminates, Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 310, 317–18 (1992). See gen-
erally PETTIT ET AL., supra note 13, at 4-25 to -31. For a state codification of this rule, see 
200 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:312, § 2(2) (2004) (“If a contractor is determined to be in default, 
the commonwealth shall notify the contractor of the determination in writing, and may in-
clude a specified date by which the contractor shall cure the identified deficiencies. The 
commonwealth may proceed with termination if the contractor fails to cure the deficiencies 
within the specified time.”).  
83  See, e.g., Universal Shelters, 87 Fed. Cl. at 144; PETTIT ET AL., supra note 13, at 4-30 to -
31; see also id. at 16-2 (discussing the low likelihood of a contractor succeeding on the mer-
its in an appeal to convert a default termination into a convenience termination). 
84  Singer, supra note 1, at 1302, 1323. 
85  Id. at 1333. 
86  Id. at 1333–34, 1337. A “call option” is “[a]n option to buy something (esp. securities) at 
a fixed price even if the market rises; the right to require another to sell.” Option, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
87  Singer, supra note 1, at 1323, 1337. 
88  Arthur L. Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 YALE L.J. 641, 641 (1914); see also Option, 
BLACK’S, supra note 86.  
89  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-86-59, PROCUREMENT: THE USE OF 
UNPRICED OPTIONS AND OTHER PRACTICES NEEDS REVISION  14 (1986), reprinted in B-
217655, 1986 WL 312402 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 23, 1986). See generally id. at 14–24.  
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agreement to negotiate a new contract on a sole source basis, which violates the 
statutory and regulatory mandate for competitive bidding.90 As such, an indefi-
nite option “should be deleted” from a contract.91 
The following illustration shows why options in CDS contracts are un-
workable: Assume the agency has placed a “firm fixed-price contract”92 for 
construction of an office building and the agency wishes to use CDS by exer-
cising an option in a second contract after the first contractor failed part way 
through the project. No feasible basis exists to make the CDS option a firm 
fixed price arrangement upfront because it would be impossible at the original 
contract placement to realistically price an “option” on a firm fixed price basis 
that would cover an unknowable amount of unfinished work starting and finish-
ing at unknown times.  
Another issue with CDS options involves their funding aspect. Singer sug-
gests that a CDS option may be exercised to fund an advance payment (he calls 
it an “up-front payment”) to the vendor to cover its “opportunity cost.”93 Be-
sides failing to mention that contracting parties often cannot feasibly price op-
portunity costs upfront, Singer also overlooks a critical detail: such advance 
payments to government contractors are widely forbidden by statute.94 Moreo-
ver, a related concern here is that the agency must have (or obtain) full funding 
for the new obligation95—a difficult task in this era of shrinking governmental 
budgets.  Of course, more fundamentally, if the (eventual) price is presently 
unknown and subject to later negotiation, a priced option is fictitious—as is, 
therefore its purported utility in funding advances. 
Full contract funding is yet another serious concern with CDS. The general 
rule is that the agency must have adequate monies obligated on the contract to 
fund the government’s commitment on the contract (a principle which applies 
                                                 
90  See, e.g., Varian Assocs., Inc., B-208281, 83-1 CPD ¶ 160, 1983 WL 26465, at *3–4 
(Comp. Gen. Feb. 16, 1983), aff’d in part, modified in part, B-208281.2, 83-2 CPD ¶ 78 
(Comp. Gen. July 12, 1983). State law cases use the same reasoning in reaching the same 
result. See, e.g., On-Point Tech. Sys., Inc. v. State, 803 A.2d 1175, 1180 (Pa. 2002) (because 
the original contract failed to contain the essential terms of the option, the contract extension 
for future work was a new contract in violation of the mandatory competitive bidding stat-
utes). 
91  Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., B-198911.3, 81-2 CPD ¶ 279, 1981 WL 23275, at *2 
(Comp. Gen. Oct. 6, 1981), aff’g Amdahl Corp., B-198911.2 et al., 81-1 CPD ¶ 213 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 27, 1981). 
92 “A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on 
the basis of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract.”  FAR 16.202-1 
(2016). 
93  Singer, supra note 1, at 1333.  
94  See 31 U.S.C. § 3324 (2012) (generally precluding these payments); accord, e.g., Ala. 
Attorney Gen., Op. No. 85-00212, Opinion Letter on Maintenance Service Contracts and 
Advanced Payments (Feb. 13, 1985) (noting that advance payments to contractors are gener-
ally “violations” of the Alabama Constitution, amended Section 93, which provides that the 
state may not lend its credit or resources to any private enterprise). 
95  See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a); FAR 17.207(c)(1); id. § 32.704(c).  
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equally to reprocurement contracts).96  Accepting for the moment Singer’s con-
tention that the shift in work as contemplated under CDS equates to a termina-
tion for convenience, this solution would violate the funding procedures. The 
agency still cannot deobligate funds remaining on the first contract and reobli-
gate them on the second contract to cover the new commitment if the original 
funds had previously expired for obligational purposes.97 By contrast, under the 
“replacement” doctrine, the opposite is true for a successor contract following a 
termination for default (i.e., under the replacement doctrine, fiscal law allows 
an agency to reobligate the funds without regard for their original availabil-
ity).98 
To illustrate the above issue more concretely, assume a federal agency un-
der CDS terminates firm A’s $10 million firm fixed price contract (fully funded 
upfront) halfway through the project after having paid $5 million of firm A’s 
invoices. If the termination is for the convenience of the government (for some 
post-award reason), and the funds have otherwise expired for obligational pur-
poses, then the agency may not deobligate the funds from A’s contract and re-
obligate them on to B’s contract. The agency usually must return the $5 million 
to the Department of the Treasury. This inability to reobligate funds with a 
convenience remedy gives the agency a strong incentive to invoke the default 
remedy in lieu of CDS. 
Lastly, contrary to Singer’s claim that CDS will reduce costs,99 CDS might 
in fact increase costs. For instance, where offerors cannot sufficiently assess 
contractual risk, they often pad their firm fixed prices to clandestinely account 
for unknown eventualities.100 Padded options are very possible under CDS.  
Thus, if the agency requires the offeror to propose a firm fixed option to take 
over another contractor’s work constructing a building, and no details exist on 
how much or when the work will be necessary, the contractor would undoubt-
edly use all the worst case scenarios to make the option a massive windfall. For 
                                                 
96  See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a); FAR 32.704(c) (prohibiting performance of government con-
tracts in the absence of proper funding). 
97  U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 5, pt. b, § 6, at 5-28 to -33 (2008) (discussing the fiscal aspects of 
termination for convenience) [hereinafter GAO RED BOOK]; see also id. ch. 5, pt. d, §§ 3, 7. 
For example, after a convenience termination, year-one 2016 funds cannot be obligated to 
exercise an option arising in fiscal year 2017. See, e.g., Ariz. Attorney Gen., Op. No. I86-
045, Opinion Letter (April 18, 1986) (no new obligations may be made against an expired 
appropriation absent statutory authority) (construing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 35-190A (1983)). 
98  GAO RED BOOK, supra note 97, at 5-28 to -29.  
99  Singer, supra note 1, at 1302 (claiming that CDS “decreases” costs); id. at 1347 (“[I]n the 
majority of cases the benefits of CDS should be expected to outweigh the additional costs.”). 
Once again, no data supports these empirical contentions. 
100  See Ralph C. Nash, Options for Additional Years of Work: Are They Overused, 23 NASH 
& CIBINIC REP. ¶ 4 (Jan. 2009) (noting that even options at fixed prices “may impose a sig-
nificant risk on the contractor or, conversely, induce the contractor to include a contingency 
in the price to protect against the risk.”). 
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some governments, these pricing issues alone could eliminate CDS as an attrac-
tive alternative. 
CONCLUSION 
Singer correctly maintains that the procurement system requires effective 
remedies to deter and correct contractor misbehavior. Yet, his CDS proposal is 
open to several criticisms. First, termination for default is a viable tool to deter 
and correct contractor misbehavior. Second, past-performance assessments are 
an effective reputational remedy. Third, CDS raises substantial practical and 
legal concerns. Consequently, I recommend that any federal, state, or local 
government considering the adoption of CDS should first weigh these concerns 
before deciding whether CDS would help it achieve fully satisfactory govern-
ment contractor performance. 
